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Abstract—In this paper, we propose a novel energy-efficient framework for an electric vehicle (EV) network using a contract
theoretic-based economic model to maximize the profits of charging stations (CSs) and improve the social welfare of the network.
Specifically, we first introduce CS-based and CS clustering-based decentralized federated energy learning (DFEL) approaches which
enable the CSs to train their own energy transactions locally to predict energy demands. In this way, each CS can exchange its learned
model with other CSs to improve prediction accuracy without revealing actual datasets and reduce communication overhead among
the CSs. Based on the energy demand prediction, we then design a multi-principal one-agent (MPOA) contract-based method. In
particular, we formulate the CSs’ utility maximization as a non-collaborative energy contract problem in which each CS maximizes its
utility under common constraints from the smart grid provider (SGP) and other CSs’ contracts. Then, we prove the existence of an
equilibrium contract solution for all the CSs and develop an iterative algorithm at the SGP to find the equilibrium. Through simulation
results using the dataset of CSs’ transactions in Dundee city, the United Kingdom between 2017 and 2018, we demonstrate that our
proposed method can achieve the energy demand prediction accuracy improvement up to 24.63% and lessen communication
overhead by 96.3% compared with other machine learning algorithms. Furthermore, our proposed method can outperform
non-contract-based economic models by 35% and 36% in terms of the CSs’ utilities and social welfare of the network, respectively.
Index Terms—Information sharing, privacy, federated learning, contract theory, EV network, demand prediction.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
A Ccording to the International Energy Agency’s latestforecast, electric vehicles (EVs) including battery EVs
and plug-in hybrid EVs will take over the existence of con-
ventional transportation systems by 2030 with 255 millions
EVs on the road [2]. Thanks to the sustainability, the EVs
have attracted worldwide recognition to provide not only
high energy efficiency, but also low gas emissions and low-
cost oil usage [3]. Nonetheless, the increasing adoption of
EVs in the near future, which creates a massive number of
energy demands, may encounter an inherent yet challeng-
ing problem for the charging station providers (CSPs) to
sustain effective energy services at their charging stations
(CSs). For example, in an unexpected situation when a vast
number of EVs urgently need to charge the battery at once,
the CSPs and their corresponding CSs may suffer from
a high energy transfer cost from the smart grid provider
(SGP) and heavy energy transfer congestion from the CSs
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to the EVs, respectively [4]. Moreover, due to the dynamic
energy charging demands from the EVs in practice, the
CSs may experience underestimation or overestimation of
energy supply for the EVs. Hence, the CSPs require to make
an effective economic model to maximize their profits, i.e.,
utilities, in the cost-effective energy transfer activity based
on the dynamic energy demands.
To deal with the dynamic energy demands and optimize
energy efficiency, we need to accurately predict energy
demands from the EVs. Among few works that investigate
energy demand prediction for EV networks, the authors
in [5], [6], [7], [8], [9] proposed machine learning-based
methods, i.e., k-nearest neighbor (kNN), online reinforce-
ment learning, multiple-regression, shallow neural network
(SNN), and deep neural network (DNN), to improve energy
demand prediction accuracy at specific CSs/EVs. Neverthe-
less, these approaches may not be useful for the whole EV
network since they evaluate the prediction individually at
each EV/CS. Moreover, each EV/CS generally has limited
number of energy request data, and thus they are not
sufficient to predict the energy demands accurately. To this
end, it is crucial to leverage shared information or global
models to predict the energy demands for further prediction
accuracy improvement of the whole network.
From the accurate prediction of energy demands, the
CSs can acquire meticulous energy transfer from the SGP
through economic models to satisfy the EVs’ energy de-
mands as well as optimize the CSs’ profits in the EV net-
work. For example, a collaborative scheme among CSs to
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2distribute energy resources for EV charging was proposed
in [10], [11], [12]. However, those previous works assumed
that all the CSs are owned by a single CSP. In reality, CSs
may belong to different CSPs, and thus there exists non-
collaborative game among the CSPs. Specifically, the CSPs
compete through their CSs to attract the SGP and upcoming
EVs for their own profit maximizations.
In [13], [14], [15], the authors presented non-
collaborative game approaches in which CSs/EVs act as
players to maximize their profits considering the influence
of their neighboring CSs/EVs. In this case, all above ap-
proaches only work when the participating entities provide
full knowledge (referred to as information symmetry) for the
energy transfer activity. In practice, the SGP generally keeps
its energy capacity as a private information (referred to as
information asymmetry) [16], and thus the above approaches
are not applicable. In addition, the above game theoretic-
based methods only consider non-negotiable mechanism.
Specifically, the SGP first informs the fixed price to the CSs.
Then, the CSs need to adjust their amount of requested
energy based on that given information without accounting
for any price negotiation between the SGP and CSs. This
inflexible process may reduce the CSs’ expected profits in
the energy transfer process. Thus, it will be challenging
to discover an appropriate energy transfer policy which
maximizes the profits for both the SGP and CSs.
Given the above, in this work we investigate a con-
tract theoretic-based economic model, an effective incen-
tive mechanism leveraging flexible common agreements
between the participating entities under the information
asymmetry [17]. For example, the authors in [18], [19], [20]
have recently proposed the contract-based approaches con-
sidering the incomplete information between a principal and
multiple agents in the energy transfer activity. In this case,
the principal offers contracts containing energy-payment
bundle while the agents are responsible to accept or reject
the offered contracts. Utilizing the contract theoretic-based
method, we can provide fair and efficient contract negotia-
tion for the principal and agents ahead of the actual energy
transfer activity. If the contracts are accepted, the principal
can maximize its utility while satisfying the individual
rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) conditions
from the agents1. However, since all the aforementioned
works assume only one principal, e.g., one CS, in the power
market, they are lack of competition to attract at least
one agent. In practice, an agent, e.g., an EV or the SGP,
may be tempted to receive several contracts from different
principals concurrently. Hence, it is necessary to develop an
effective contract-based policy for multiple principals, e.g.,
the competing CSs, to maximize their profits considering the
agent’s IR and IC constraints and enhance the social welfare
of the EV network.
This work aims to develop a novel energy-efficient
framework for an EV network of CSs using a multi-principal
one-agent (MPOA) contract-based economic model [21]. To
that end, we first introduce a novel CS-based decentralized
federated energy learning (DFEL) method where each CS
1. The IR conditions play important roles in ensuring that the agents
always achieve positive utilities. Meanwhile, the IC conditions guaran-
tee maximum utilities of the agents when the best contracts from the
principal are used.
can train its transaction dataset locally and send its learned
model only, i.e., local gradient, to other CSs via the internet
for global model update. In this way, we can enhance the
upcoming energy demand prediction accuracy and decrease
the communication overhead among the CSs. To efficiently
minimize the biased prediction, i.e., the problem which is
influenced by the combination of imbalanced features and
labels in one dataset, we incorporate the CS clustering-based
DFEL solution. Particularly, this solution can categorize the
CSs into several groups prior to the independent execution
of learning algorithm in each group. This aims to reduce the
dataset dimension based on the important feature classifica-
tion [22], and thus further improve the prediction accuracy
and the learning speed of the CSs.
Based on the energy demand prediction from the CS-
based DFEL method, we formulate the CSs’ utility maxi-
mization as a non-collaborative energy contract optimiza-
tion problem leveraging the MPOA contract policy. Specif-
ically, each CS maximizes its utility under the SGP’s IR
and IC constraints as well as other CSs’ contracts to im-
prove the social welfare of the EV network. This problem
is implemented at the SGP because each CS only shares
energy demand information with the SGP to minimize
private information disclosure with other CSs. Then, we
prove the existence of equilibrium contract solution for all
the CSs and develop an iterative energy contract algorithm
which can obtain the equilibrium. In this case, all the CSs
achieve maximum utilities when the optimal contracts from
them (which meet IC and IR constraints of the SGP) are
applied. This equilibrium solution can achieve the social
welfare within 9% of that obtained by the information-
symmetry energy contract, i.e., when each CS completely
knows the current energy demands of other CSs and the
true type of the SGP. Through simulation results, we show
that our proposed method can obtain 24.63% higher than
other centralized machine learning methods [23] in terms
of the energy demand prediction accuracy. Furthermore, the
proposed method can reduce the communication overhead
by 96.3% compared with them. We also demonstrate that
our proposed method can increase the utilities of the CSs up
to 35% and the social welfare by 36% compared with non-
contract-based economic models [24] in the energy transfer
activity.
The main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We introduce the machine learning-based methods
that utilize the CS-based DFEL and the CS clustering-
based DFEL algorithms to improve the energy de-
mand prediction accuracy, reduce the communica-
tion overhead for CSs, and boost the learning speed.
• We formulate the non-collaborative problem that
leverages the MPOA contract-based approach to
maximize the utilities of the CSs and enhance the
social welfare of the EV network.
• We develop the iterative energy contract algorithm
which can find the equilibrium contract solution.
We show that the final solution of the algorithm
can achieve less than 9% gap from the information-
symmetry energy contract solution.
• We perform comprehensive simulations to evaluate
the proposed method using the actual CS dataset
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Fig. 1: EV network system model.
in Dundee city, the United Kingdom. These results
provide insightful information to help the CSs in de-
signing the efficient learning methods and obtaining
the best contracts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes the energy-efficient EV network framework. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the problem formulation. Section 4 intro-
duces the DFEL algorithm along with the clustering-based
method. Then, Section 5 and Section 6 present the problem
transformation and the proposed solution of the contract-
based model, respectively. The performance evaluation is
given in Section 7, and then conclusion is drawn in Section 8.
2 ENERGY-EFFICIENT EV NETWORK FRAME-
WORK
In this section, we describe the EV network system model
along with the utility function definitions of the SGP and
CSs.
2.1 System Model
The EV network system model is illustrated in Fig. 1. In par-
ticular, multiple CSPs orchestrate CSs to obtain the energy
from the power sources through a power grid system (which
is controlled by an SGP) prior to EV charging at the CSs.
For a particular period, each CS utilizes a record file which
involves the EV charging transactions including CS and EV
identifiers, transaction date, transaction time, and energy
usage to keep track of all charging activities of the served
EVs. To deal with the dynamic charging of the EVs, the CS
will capture and update the record file regularly, e.g., every
day [1]. Then, the CS can use this file to predict its energy
demand for the upcoming period. Nonetheless, the number
of charging transactions at each CS may not be sufficient
to accurately predict the energy demand. Consequently,
each CS requires to exchange its learned model, i.e., local
gradient, to other CSs right after completing the energy
demand learning over its local charging transaction dataset.
Upon predicting the energy demand, each CS can offer a
contract containing predicted energy demand and offered
payment to the SGP at a pre-defined time interval, i.e., every
day or every week, to maximize its utility for energy transfer
activity.
We denote I = {1, . . . , i, . . . , I} and Ni =
{1, . . . , n, . . . , Ni} to be the set of CSs in the EV network
and the set of EV charging transactions at CS-i, respectively.
Then, we specify the total energy demand and the energy
demand of transaction n at CS-i as ξi and ξni , respectively.
To perform energy transfer activity for the CSs, the SGP
requires to store an amount of energy at its storage with the
energy capacity of S. We also denote ρi and %i to be the
energy transfer payment for the SGP at CS-i and the energy
charging price per MWh for EVs at CS-i, respectively. To
represent the SGP’s private information, i.e., energy capac-
ity [16] and the willingness to transfer energy [25], we define
Φ = {φmin, . . . , φ, . . . , φmax} to be the set of the SGP’s
types, where φmin and φmax refer to the lowest and highest
possible types of the SGP, respectively. In practice, the SGP
may have finite number of possible types [26]. As such, the
SGP with a higher type implies a larger energy capacity
and a higher willingness to transfer energy for the CSs. For
example, the SGP with type 1, type 2, and type 3 represent
small, intermediate, and large energy capacity, respectively.
Despite that the CSs do not have any knowledge of the exact
type of the SGP, they can still observe the distributions of all
possible types [25], [26], which is defined as p(φ),∀φ ∈ Φ.
From the p(φ), each CS can offer an energy contract to the
SGP according to its own energy demand and financial plan.
To participate in the energy transfer, the SGP will gen-
erate a proportion of each CS’s energy demand due to
the limited energy at the SGP’s storage. Particularly, we
specify a vector of proportions that the SGP with type
φ will transfer the requested energy to all the CSs by
pi = [pi1, . . . , pii, . . . , piI ], where 0 ≤ pii ≤ 1 (as the
SGP knows its own type, we do not need to consider
the proportion as a function of type φ). Furthermore, we
define a vector of all the CSs’ requested energy by ξ(φ) =
[ξ1(φ), . . . , ξi(φ), . . . , ξI(φ)],∀φ ∈ Φ, where ξi(φ) ≥ 0,∀i ∈
I,∀φ ∈ Φ. Correspondingly, for all energy demands, all the
CSs will offer a vector of payments to the SGP which is
denoted by ρ(φ) = [ρ1(φ), . . . , ρi(φ), . . . , ρI(φ)],∀φ ∈ Φ,
where ρi(φ) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ I,∀φ ∈ Φ. Intuitively, the payment
increases when the requested energy increases and vice
versa [19], [27], i.e., dρi(φ)dξi(φ) > 0,
dξi(φ)
dρi(φ)
> 0,∀i ∈ I,∀φ ∈ Φ.
2.2 Utility Functions of the SGP and CSs
Given ξ(φ) and ρ(φ), the utility function of the SGP with
type φ is expressed by
φG(pi,ρ(φ))− C(pi, ξ(φ)), (1)
where φ in the first component is to show the true type of the
SGP when receiving certain contracts from CSs. Moreover,
G(pi,ρ(φ)) and C(pi, ξ(φ)) represent the gain and cost func-
tions, respectively. Specifically, we apply a natural logarithm
function which is widely used to quantify the gain of energy
providers [19], [28]. Thus, the gain function can be written
by
G(pi,ρ(φ)) = ln
(
1 +
I∑
i=1
piiρi(φ)
)
. (2)
From Eq. (2), the gain function follows the law of dimin-
ishing returns, i.e., the function increases as the received
4payments from the CSs increase and the marginal utility
keeps decreasing until the function achieves the saturation
point [29]. Meanwhile, the cost function of the SGP to
transfer energy for all CSs can be formulated by
C(pi, ξ(φ)) = ζ
I∑
i=1
piiξi(φ), (3)
where ζ > 0 is the energy transfer cost per unit.
According to Eq. (1), we need to maximize the utility of
the SGP with type φ as the following optimization problem:
(P1) max
pi
φG(pi,ρ(φ))− C(pi, ξ(φ)). (4)
s.t.
I∑
i=1
piiξi(φ) ≤ S(φ), (5)
0 ≤ pii ≤ 1,∀i ∈ I, (6)
where S(φ) represents the energy capacity for the SGP with
type φ. The constraint (5) specifies that the total amount
of actual energy demands from CSs must not exceed the
energy capacity of the SGP. Based on (P1), we can find the
optimal pˆi, where pˆi = [pˆi1, . . . , pˆii, . . . , pˆiI ]. This pˆi can be ob-
tained straightforwardly due to the convexity of the SGP’s
utility function. Specifically, the gain function follows the
law of diminishing returns with a positive, strictly concave,
continuously differentiable, and strictly increasing utility
function [21], [28], i.e., G(pi, 0) = 0, G′(pi,ρ(φ)) > 0, and
G′′(pi,ρ(φ)) < 0 for all ρ(φ). In addition, the cost function
holds a linear function which is a positive and strictly
increasing function [17]. Considering pˆi, the CSs compensate
energy transfer payments to obtain certain amount of en-
ergy from the SGP. As a result, the expected utility function
of a CS-i, which specifies the expected profit of the CS-i
obtained from the energy charging activity to EVs, can be
expressed as
Ui(ρ(φ), ξ(φ)) = pˆii
φmax∑
φ=φmin
(
%iξi(φ)− ρi(φ)
)
p(φ), (7)
where
φmax∑
φ=φmin
p(φ) = 1, pˆii
(
%iξi(φ) − ρi(φ)
)
is the actual
utility function of CS-i which implements the possible type
φ, and %i > 0 is the gain parameter representing the energy
price unit per MWh for served EVs at CS-i. Furthermore,
the use of
∑
(.) indicates that the expected utility of each CS
relies on the SGP’s possible type distribution.
From the optimal proportions pˆi, and contracts(
ρ(φ), ξ(φ)
)
,∀φ ∈ Φ, we can derive the social welfare of
the network as the total ulitilies of the SGP with type φ and
all the participating CSs, which is
USW (φ) = φ ln
(
1 +
I∑
i=1
pˆiiρi(φ)
)
− ζ
I∑
i=1
pˆiiξi(φ)
+
I∑
i=1
pˆii
(
%iξi(φ)− ρi(φ)
)
,∀φ ∈ Φ.
(8)
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
Based on the utility functions in Eq. (1)-(7), we can formulate
the energy contract optimization problem utilizing I CSs
as the principals and one SGP as the agent in the EV
network. The objective is to maximize the expected profits,
i.e., utilities, of all CSs independently while satisfying the
utility requirements of the SGP. First, as a benchmark case,
consider that each CS has current energy demand informa-
tion from other CSs and the true type, i.e., energy capacity, of
the SGP. In this case, the offered contracts
(
ρ(φ), ξ(φ)
)
for
type φ must satisfy individual rationality (IR) requirements
as defined in Definition 1.
Definition 1. Individual rationality constraint: The SGP must
obtain a non-negative utility, i.e.,
φG(pˆi,ρ(φ))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ)) ≥ 0,∀φ ∈ Φ. (9)
Given the SGP’s type φ, we can formulate the
information-symmetry energy contract optimization prob-
lem for each CS-i to maximize its utility as follows:
(P2) max
ρ(φ),ξ(φ)
pˆii
(
%iξi(φ)− ρi(φ)
)
,∀i ∈ I, (10)
s.t.
I∑
i=1
pˆiiξi(φ) ≤ S(φ), (11)
φG(pˆi,ρ(φ))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ)) ≥ 0. (12)
In practice, the SGP keeps its type, i.e., the energy
capacity and the willingness to transfer energy, private
and unobservable to the CSs. As a result, it leads to the
information asymmetry between the SGP and the CSs. Due
to this information asymmetry, in addition to the IR con-
straints, the offered contracts must also satisfy the incentive
compatibility (IC) constraints (as defined in the following
Definition 2) to ensure the feasibility of the contracts.
Definition 2. Incentive compatibility constraint: The SGP with
type φ obtains maximum utility when it receives contracts de-
signed for its true type φ, i.e.,
φG(pˆi,ρ(φ))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ)) ≥ φG(pˆi,ρ(φˆ))− C(pˆi, ξ(φˆ)),
φ 6= φˆ, ∀φ, φˆ ∈ Φ,
(13)
where φˆ, ∀φˆ ∈ Φ are possible types of the SGP with φˆ 6= φ.
From the aforementioned IR and IC constraints, we can
formulate a non-collaborative energy contract optimization
problem where multiple CSPs through their CSs do not
exchange the energy demand information with each other
due to their selfishness and privacy concerns. Specifically,
each CSP controls different CSs and offers a contract to the
SGP separately. In other words, each CS-i can communicate
with the SGP independently using its individual contract(
ρi(φ), ξi(φ)
)
. Then, the energy contract optimization prob-
lem (P3) to maximize the expected utility for CS-i sepa-
rately at the SGP can be written as
(P3) max
ρ(φ),ξ(φ)
Ui(ρ(φ), ξ(φ)),∀i ∈ I, (14)
s.t.
I∑
i=1
pˆiiξi(φ) ≤ S(φ),∀φ ∈ Φ, (15)
φG(pˆi,ρ(φ))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ)) ≥ 0,∀φ ∈ Φ, (16)
φG(pˆi,ρ(φ))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ)) ≥
φG(pˆi,ρ(φˆ))− C(pˆi, ξ(φˆ)), φ 6= φˆ, ∀φ, φˆ ∈ Φ. (17)
From the (P3), the SGP’s choice of pˆii will impact the
optimal contract of CS-i. In particular, the SGP is expected to
give more proportions to a CS which requests lower energy
5transfer because this CS can help to increase the SGP’s
utility. Meanwhile, the CS can obtain higher utility when
it requests a larger amount of energy transfer to the SGP.
These conditions trigger a utility maximization trade-off
between the SGP and CSs. In this way, each CS will compete
with other CSs in a competition strategy to attract the SGP
and find an equilibrium solution. Given the equilibrium
contract choices of other CSs
(
ρˆ−i(φ), ξˆ−i(φ)
)
,∀φ ∈ Φ, the
expected utility of CS-i with equilibrium contract selection(
ρˆi(φ), ξˆi(φ)
)
,∀φ ∈ Φ must be the maximum one among
the expected utilities of the CS-i as defined in Definition 3.
In other words, there is no CS-i which has an additional
expected utility to deviate from its
(
ρˆi(φ), ξˆi(φ)
)
,∀φ ∈ Φ,
unilaterally.
Definition 3. Equilibrium contract solution for non-
collaborative energy contract optimization problem: The optimal
contracts
(
ρˆ(φ), ξˆ(φ)
)
,∀φ ∈ Φ, are the equilibrium solution of
the (P3) if and only if the following conditions hold
Ui(ρˆi(φ), ξˆi(φ), ρˆ−i(φ), ξˆ−i(φ)) ≥
Ui(ρi(φ), ξi(φ), ρˆ−i(φ), ξˆ−i(φ)),∀φ ∈ Φ,∀i ∈ I,
(18)
that satisfy the constraints (16) and (17).
To find the optimal contracts
(
ρˆ(φ), ξˆ(φ)
)
and then
achieve the maximum profits of CSs while improving the
social welfare of the EV network, we propose the following
procedures as illustrated in Fig. 2. First, the CSs require to
predict energy demands for all the CSs utilizing federated
learning to enhance the prediction accuracy. Based on this
accurate prediction, the CSs send initial contracts containing
the predicted energy demand and offered payment infor-
mation to the SGP. Then, we develop the feasible MPOA
contract-based problem through transforming the (P3) into
simplified problem at the SGP. Based on the problem trans-
formation, we can design the iterative energy contract al-
gorithm as the proposed solution to find the equilibrium
contract solution, i.e., optimal contracts, before sending back
to the CSs.
4 FEDERATED ENERGY LEARNING
In this section, we aim to predict energy demands of CSs
locally using a CS-based DFEL method. We then extend the
framework by applying a CS clustering-based method to
further improve the prediction accuracy and the learning
speed. All methods are applicable in the following scenarios.
4.1 CS-Based Decentralized Federated Energy Learn-
ing
In this method, each CS can train its local energy charging
transaction dataset independently as shown in Fig. 3(a).
The CS can then send and receive learned models, i.e.,
gradient information of the DNN, only to and from other
CSs, respectively. This is different from the conventional or
centralized learning method where all the CSs send their
local actual datasets to the cloud server for the learning
process. Leveraging the proposed learning method, we can
predict the energy demand of the CSs accurately and reduce
the communication overhead as well as private information
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disclosure of the CSs significantly. Naturally, the CSs com-
pete to attract incoming EVs, and thus it is beneficial to keep
their economic model private from each other. Using its
own and other CSs’ learned models, the CS can update the
global model locally [30]. Then, the CSs can use the current
global model to train its own energy charging transaction
dataset using the learning algorithm for the next interval.
As such, the CSs operate as workers to train their EV charg-
ing transactions, i.e., Wi, including CS and EV identifiers,
transaction date, and transaction time as the features as well
as ξni ,∀n ∈ Ni, ∀i ∈ I as the label, locally.
To train the dataset at CSs, we utilize a deep learning
algorithm through the DNN. In particular, consider L =
{1, . . . , l, . . . , L} as the set of learning layers. In each layer-l,
we have Al as the global weight matrix and bl as the global
bias vector. Then, each CS can generate the learning input
matrix based on the Wi of layer l, i.e., Wli, to obtain the
learning output matrix of layer-l by
Wˆli = αi
(
AlW
l
i + bl
)
, (19)
where αi represents a tanh activation function [31] to deter-
mine the output of DNN using the hyperbolic tangent of
Wli at CS-i as follows:
αi =
eW
l
i − e−Wli
eW
l
i + e−Wli
. (20)
The use of this function is to avoid zero-value gradient
when the weight matrix is initialized. We also apply several
hidden layers l, where 1 < l < L and Wl+1i = Wˆ
l
i. To
deal with the overfitting and generalization error, we add
a dropout layer ldrop, where ldrop < L, after the final hidden
layer. In this case, the ldrop will randomly drop the W
ldrop
i
with a certain fraction rate.
Considering A = [A1, . . . ,Al, . . . ,AL] and b =
[b1, . . . ,bl, . . . ,bL] as the global weight and bias vectors of
all layers, we can define ψ = (A,b) as the global model for
all layers. Then, we can derive the prediction error ωi(ψ
(τ))
for the time when we have checked all charging transactions
of Wi, i.e., epoch time τ , at CS-i by
ωi(ψ
(τ)) =
Ni∑
n=1
ωni (ψ
(τ)), (21)
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Fig. 3: The proposed federated energy learning.
where ωni (ψ
(τ)) = (wˆni − wni )2, with wni and wˆni are the
components of learning input matrix W1i and learning
output matrix WˆLi , respectively. Based on ωi(ψ
(τ)), the local
gradient of CS-i at τ can be calculated by
∇ψ(τ)i =
∂ωi(ψ
(τ))
∂ψ(τ)
. (22)
Upon obtaining ∇ψ(τ)i ,∀i ∈ I , the CSs exchange them for
global gradient accumulation through the internet which is
described by
∇ψ(τ) = 1
I
I∑
i=1
∇ψ(τ)i . (23)
To guarantee that there is no outdated global model to calcu-
late the local gradients, we apply the gradient accumulation
after successfully collecting I local gradients from all the
CSs on the internet. Then, this accumulated global gradient
is sent back to the CSs for the global model update. In this
way, all the CSs can share the local gradients and update the
global model ψ(τ) collaboratively to leverage the prediction
accuracy.
To obtain minimum prediction error, i.e., min
ψ
ωi(ψ),
we use Adam optimizer as the adaptive learning rate [32],
aiming at producing high robustness and achieving fast
convergence to the global model. Specifically, we denote
ητ and δτ to be the exponential moving average of the
∇ψ(τ) and the squared ∇ψ(τ) to obtain the variance at τ ,
respectively. Then, we can express the update rules of ητ+1
and δτ+1 in the following equation:
ητ+1 = γ
τ
ηητ + (1− γτη )∇ψ(τ),
δτ+1 = γ
τ
δ δτ + (1− γτδ )(∇ψ(τ))2,
(24)
where γτη and γ
τ
δ ∈ [0, 1) specify ητ ’s and δτ ’s steps of the
exponential decays at τ , respectively. To further control how
often the global model is updated, we also account for the
learning step λ. As such, we can update the λ as follows:
λτ+1 = λ
√
1− γτ+1δ
1− γτ+1η
. (25)
Finally, we can update the global model ψ(τ+1) to train
Wi,∀i ∈ I , for the next τ + 1 by
ψ(τ+1) = ψ(τ) − λτ+1 ητ+1√
δτ+1 + ε
, (26)
where ε indicates a fixed value to avoid zero division when
the
√
δτ+1 closes to zero. The learning process are repeated
until the prediction error reaches a minimum convergence,
or a pre-defined epoch time threshold τepoch is obtained. To
predict Wˆ∗i ,∀i ∈ I of training dataset Wi,∀i ∈ I and
new dataset at CS-i, ∀i ∈ I , we can first generate the final
global model ψ∗ and then use Eq. (19) at all the CSs. The
summary of the CS-based DFEL algorithm is presented in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 CS-Based DFEL Algorithm
1: Set αi,∀i ∈ I and initial ψ(τ) when τ = 0 for all CSs
2: Generate Wi containing ξni ,∀n ∈ Ni, ∀i ∈ I
3: while τ ≤ τepoch and ωi(ψ(τ)),∀i ∈ I do not converge
do
4: for ∀i ∈ I do
5: W1i to produce Wˆ
L
i at layer-L using ψ
(τ)
6: Compute ωi(ψ
(τ)) and ∇ψ(τ)i
7: Send ∇ψ(τ)i to the internet for global gradient ac-
cumulation
8: Receive ∇ψ(τ) from the internet
9: Calculate ψ(τ)
10: Update global model ψ(τ+1)
11: end for
12: τ ← τ + 1
13: end while
14: for ∀i ∈ I do
15: Predict Wˆ∗i for the next-interval energy demands
using W∗i and ψ
∗
16: end for
4.2 CS Clustering-Based Energy Learning
Due to the learned model exchanges among large number of
CSs, the use of CS-based DFEL method may slow down the
learning process. Moreover, the CS-based DFEL algorithm
may provide biased energy demand prediction if we do not
7take the important feature classfication into account when
learning the dataset. This may occur if we join disparated
features and defined labels into one dataset. To address
these issues, we can classify all CSs in the EV network into
K clusters of CSs prior to the learning process. This aims
to obtain better prediction accuracy and learning speed (as
illustrated in Fig. 3(b)). In particular, we first determine the
clustering decision based on the public location information
sharing of the CSs including the latitude and longitude.
Then, we use the constrained K-means algorithm [33] to
implement the clustering scheme. As such, we revise the
constrained K-means algorithm to produce even distribu-
tion of the CSs in each cluster under the thresholds of
minimum and maximum cluster sizes. In this way, we can
guarantee that the learning process in each cluster achieves
the fairness with respect to their deployment locations.
Suppose that G is the dataset which corresponds to
CS IDs and their locations, i.e., gi,∀i ∈ I , and K =
{1, . . . , k, . . . ,K} is the set of clusters. We can find cluster
centers, i.e., gˆk,∀k ∈ K, in such a way that we minimize
the overall squared distance between each gi and its closest
cluster center gˆk as follows:
min
{ϕ,q}
∑
i∈I
∑
k∈K
ϕki (gi − gˆk)2, (27)
s.t. ϕklow ≤
∑
i∈I
ϕki ≤ ϕkhigh,∀k ∈ K, (28)∑
k∈K
ϕki = 1,∀i ∈ I, (29)
ϕki ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K, (30)
ϕklow ≥ 0, ϕkhigh ≥ 0,∀k ∈ K, (31)
where ϕki is a binary variable that specifies the CS-i’s lo-
cation from the cluster center gˆk. Specifically, if the CS-i’s
location is the closest to the cluster center gˆk, then ϕki = 1,
otherwise ϕki = 0. The constraints (28) ensure that the
pre-defined minimum ϕklow and maximum ϕ
k
low thresholds
bound each cluster size. Moreover, the constraints (29) imply
that the location of each CS is classified into one unique
cluster only.
At each iteration ι, we update the cluster center gˆ(ι)k
to achieve the optimal cluster solution. Particularly, if we
have ϕklow ≤
∑
i∈I
ϕki ≤ ϕkhigh in the cluster-k, then gˆ(ι+1)k =∑
i∈I
ϕ
k,(ι)
i gi∑
i∈I
ϕ
k,(ι)
i
, and gˆ(ι+1)k = gˆ
(ι)
k , otherwise. The process com-
pletes when gˆ(ι+1)k = gˆ
(ι)
k ,∀k ∈ K. As a result, we can
generate Ik as the optimal set of the CSs for each cluster-
k. Upon completing the clustering process, we can execute
the CS-based DFEL method to predict the CSs’ energy
demands in each cluster separately. In Algorithm 2, we show
the CS clustering-based DFEL algorithm utilizing revised
constrained K-means optimization.
5 MULTI-PRINCIPAL ONE-AGENT CONTRACT-
BASED PROBLEM TRANSFORMATION
Based on the predicted energy demand for all CSs from
the federated energy learning process, each CS can offer
an initial contract, i.e., the predicted energy demand and
offered payment, to the SGP for the energy contract iterative
Algorithm 2 CS Clustering-Based DFEL Algorithm
1: Set G containing gi,∀i ∈ I
2: Determine K and randomize gˆ(ι)k ,∀k ∈ K for ι = 0, 1
with gˆ(1)k 6= gˆ(0)k
3: while gˆ(ι+1)k 6= gˆ(ι)k ,∀k ∈ K do
4: Execute revised constrained K-Means in Eqs. (27)-(31)
5: Update ι← ι+ 1
6: for ∀k ∈ K do
7: if ϕklow ≤
∑
i∈I
ϕki ≤ ϕkhigh then
8: gˆ
(ι+1)
k =
∑
i∈I
ϕ
k,(ι)
i gi∑
i∈I
ϕ
k,(ι)
i
9: else
10: gˆ
(ι+1)
k = gˆ
(ι)
k
11: end if
12: end for
13: end while
14: for ∀k ∈ K do
15: Find the optimal set of CSs Ik in the cluster-k
16: Implement CS-based DFEL approach using Algo-
rithm 1 in the cluster-k
17: end for
process. To this end, we need to simplify the optimization
problem (P3) by reducing the number of IR constraints in
Eq. (16) and IC constraints in Eq. (17) due to the complexity
(especially when the number of possible types grows sig-
nificantly in the iterative process). Based on the following
Lemma 1, the computational complexity of (P3) follows
O(φ2tot), where φtot is the total number of the SGP’s possible
types.
Lemma 1. The problem (P3) has computational complexity
O(φ2tot).
Proof. See Appendix A.
To solve the problem faster, we can reduce the compu-
tational complexity into O(φtot) through transforming the
IR and IC constraints as explained in the following section.
To do so, we first demonstrate that when the SGP’s type is
higher, CSs will request larger amount of energy and offer
higher payments to the SGP. This condition can be formally
written in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Let (ρ, ξ) denote any feasible contract from CSs to
the SGP such that if φ > φ∗, then ρ(φ) > ρ(φ∗), and if φ = φ∗,
then ρ(φ) = ρ(φ∗), where φ, φ∗ ∈ Φ.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Based on Lemma 2, we observe that the utility function
of the SGP follows a monotonic increasing function of φ,
i.e., if φ > φ∗, then ρ(φ) > ρ(φ∗) and φG(pˆi,ρ(φ)) −
C(pˆi, ξ(φ)) > φ∗G(pˆi,ρ(φ∗)) − C(pˆi, ξ(φ∗)). Consequently,
we can lessen the number of IR constraints by using the
φmin. Particularly, by utilizing the IC constraints, we obtain
φG(pˆi,ρ(φ))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ)) ≥
φG(pˆi,ρ(φmin))− C(pˆi, ξ(φmin)) ≥
φminG(pˆi,ρ(φmin))− C(pˆi, ξ(φmin)) ≥ 0.
(32)
8In other words, the IR constraints for other φ, where
φ > φmin, will hold as long as the IR constraint for φmin is
satisfied. Alternatively, we can transform the IR constraints
in Eq. (16) into
φminG(pˆi,ρ(φmin))− C(pˆi, ξ(φmin)) ≥ 0. (33)
Similar to the IR constraint simplification, we can reduce
the number of IC constraints by transforming them using
the following conditions stated in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. The IC constraints in Eq. (17) of (P3) are equivalent
to the following monotonicity and local incentive compatibility
conditions, i.e.,
dρ(φ)
dφ
≥ 0,∀φ ∈ Φ, (34)
and
φ
dG(pˆi,ρ(φ))
dφ
− dC(pˆi, ξ(φ))
dφ
≥ 0,∀φ ∈ Φ, (35)
respectively.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The conditions in Eq. (34) imply that a higher type of
the SGP will require higher offered payments from CSs
as described in Lemma 2. Furthermore, the conditions in
Eq. (35) indicate that if for each type φ, the IC constraint
regarding the type that is lower than φ holds, then all other
IC constraints are also satisfied as long as the conditions in
Eq. (34) hold.
Based on the aforementioned constraint transformation
in Eqs. (33)-(35), we can rewrite the optimization problem
(P3) into
(P4) max
ρ(φ),ξ(φ)
Ui(ρ(φ), ξ(φ)),∀i ∈ I, (36)
s.t. (15) and,
φminG(pˆi,ρ(φmin))− C(pˆi, ξ(φmin)) ≥ 0, (37)
φdG(pˆi,ρ(φ))dφ − dC(pˆi,ξ(φ))dφ ≥ 0,∀φ ∈ Φ, (38)
dρ(φ)
dφ ≥ 0,∀φ ∈ Φ. (39)
Then, we can transfrom the left side of the constraints (38)
as below
φ
dG(pˆi,ρ(φ))
dφ
− dC(pˆi, ξ(φ))
dφ
=
φ
1 +
I∑
i=1
pˆiiρi(φ)
I∑
i=1
pˆii
dρi(φ)
dφ
− ζ
I∑
i=1
pˆii
dξi(φ)
dφ
= φ
I∑
i=1
pˆii
dρi(φ)
dφ
−
(
1 +
I∑
i=1
pˆiiρi(φ)
)(
ζ
I∑
i=1
pˆii
dξi(φ)
dφ
)
.
(40)
Since the SGP has discrete number of possible types, i.e.,
1, 2, . . . , φmax, the gap between two consecutive types is 1,
i.e., dφ = 1. Thus, we can modify dρi(φ)dφ and
dξi(φ)
dφ by
dρi(φ)
dφ
=
ρi(φ)− ρi(φ− dφ)
dφ
= ρi(φ)− ρi(φ− 1),
(41)
and
dξi(φ)
dφ
=
ξi(φ)− ξi(φ− dφ)
dφ
= ξi(φ)− ξi(φ− 1),
(42)
respectively. Then, from Eq. (40), we have
φ
dG(pˆi,ρ(φ))
dφ
− dC(pˆi, ξ(φ))
dφ
= φ
I∑
i=1
pˆii
(
ρi(φ)− ρi(φ− 1)
)
−(
1 +
I∑
i=1
pˆiiρi(φ)
)(
ζ
I∑
i=1
pˆii
(
ξi(φ)− ξi(φ− 1)
))
.
(43)
As a result, the simplified version of (P4) is
(P5) max
ρ(φ),ξ(φ)
Ui(ρ(φ), ξ(φ)),∀i ∈ I, (44)
s.t. (15), (37) and,
φ
I∑
i=1
pˆii
(
ρi(φ)− ρi(φ− 1)
)
−(
1 +
I∑
i=1
pˆiiρi(φ)
)(
ζ
I∑
i=1
pˆii
(
ξi(φ)− ξi(φ− 1)
))
≥ 0,∀φ ∈ Φ, (45)
ρi(φ)− ρi(φ− 1) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ I,∀φ ∈ Φ. (46)
Finally, we demonstrate that the problem (P5) has com-
putational complexity O(φtot) as stated in the following
Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. The problem (P5) has computational complexity
O(φtot).
Proof. See Appendix D.
6 NON-COLLABORATIVE ENERGY CONTRACT SO-
LUTION
6.1 Energy Contract Iterative Algorithm
To find the optimal contracts from (P5), we propose an
iterative algorithm as shown in Algorithm 1. In particular,
we first find the optimal values of pˆi maximize the objective
function of nonlinear programming problem (P1). Given pˆi
and other CSs’ current contracts remain pre-defined [34],
[35] at the SGP, we execute the iterative algorithm. Using
this algorithm, the SGP can update the possible contract
of each CS, which maximizes the CS’s expected utility for
each iteration. Specifically, the current contract of each CS-
i can be applied if its current expected utility is higher
than the previous one when the previous contract of the CS
is used. Otherwise, the previous contract will be utilized.
The algorithm will terminate when the expected utilities
of all CSs reach the optimality tolerance κ (i.e., no further
improvement in the expected utility), and thus the algo-
rithm converges where the equilibrium contract solution is
achieved. In this way, the SGP can provide fair competition
among the participating CSs based on their offered energy
contracts.
6.2 Convergence and Equilibrium Contract Analysis
In this section, we investigate the convergence and equilib-
rium contract solution for the proposed non-collaborative
MPOA contract problem. Specifically, we define the commu-
nication between the SGP and CSs as a two-stage game [36]
to find the equilibrium. In the first stage, each CS generates
a contract and notices that other CSs non-collaboratively
9Algorithm 3 Energy Contract Iterative Algorithm
1: The SGP notifies the current price for a unit energy
(MWh) to all CSs
2: Initialize κ and θ = 0
3: Each CS-i offers initial contract
(
ρ
(θ)
i (φ), ξ
(θ)
i (φ)
)
,∀φ ∈
Φ, to the SGP
4: repeat
5: Find pˆi(θ) which maximize (P1) given(
ρ(θ)(φ), ξ(θ)(φ)
)
and the SGP’s type φ
6: for ∀i ∈ I do
7: Obtain a new contract
(
ρ
(θ+1)
i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
i (φ)
)
,∀φ ∈
Φ, which maximizes (P5) using pˆi
(θ) and(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
,∀φ ∈ Φ
8: if
[
Ui
(
ρ
(θ+1)
i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
i (φ),ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
−
Ui
(
ρ
(θ)
i (φ), ξ
(θ)
i (φ),ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)]
> κ then
9: Set
(
ρ
(θ)
i (φ), ξ
(θ)
i (φ)
)
=
(
ρ
(θ+1)
i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
i (φ)
)
,
∀φ ∈ Φ
10: end if
11: end for
12: until Ui
(
ρ
(θ)
i (φ), ξ
(θ)
i (φ),ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
,∀i ∈ I , do
not change anymore
13: Attain
(
ρˆ(φ), ξˆ(φ)
)
, ∀φ ∈ Φ
choose their own contracts simultaneously at the same time.
These selected contracts are then sent to the SGP for the
second stage process. As such, the SGP finds the optimal
energy proportions of the CSs based on its type to maximize
its own utility. Since each CS does not have any contract
information from other CSs due the privacy concern, the
SGP can help the CSs to process the second stage locally.
Then, we only need to show that the Algorithm 3 converges
to the equilibrium contract solution. This can be executed
through observing the best responses [34] containing the
best contracts from all the CSs at each iteration. Specifically,
the best response of CS-i given
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
at itera-
tion θ + 1 can be defined by
Γ
(θ+1)
i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
=
arg max
{ρi(φ),ξi(φ)}∈Ci
Ui
(
ρ
(θ+1)
i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
i (φ),ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
,
(47)
where Ci is the non-empty contract space [37] for CS-i and
C =
∏
i∈I
Ci. Based on the Algorithm 3, the current contract
of CS-i can be updated to
(
ρ
(θ+1)
i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
i (φ)
)
∈ Γ(θ+1)i if
the following condition holds
Ui
(
ρ
(θ+1)
i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
i (φ),ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
−
Ui
(
ρ
(θ)
i (φ), ξ
(θ)
i (φ),ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
> κ.
(48)
The process continues until the algorithm converges for all
CSs as described in Theorem 1.
THEOREM 1. The best response iterative process in Algorithm 3
converges under the optimality tolerance κ.
Proof. See Appendix E.
To guarantee that the algorithm converges to the equi-
librium contract solution
(
ρˆ(φ), ξˆ(φ)
)
,∀φ ∈ Φ, we first
observe that the equilibrium contract solution exists through
identifying a fixed point in a set-valued function Γ, Γ : C→
2C, such that
Γ =
[
Γi
(
ρ−i(φ), ξ−i(φ)
)
,Γ−i
(
ρi(φ), ξi(φ)
)]
. (49)
The existence of this fixed point is equivalent to the equi-
librium solution [21], [37]. Then, we can show that the
Algorithm 3 converges to the equilibrium contract solution,
i.e., all the CSs obtain the maximum expected utilities where
the
(
ρˆ(φ), ξˆ(φ)
)
is found, as formally stated in Theorem 2.
THEOREM 2. The Algorithm 3 drives the best response iterative
process to its equilibrium contract solution
(
ρˆ(φ), ξˆ(φ)
)
,∀φ ∈
Φ, through obtaining a fixed point
(
ρ∗(φ), ξ∗(φ)
)
,∀φ ∈ Φ, in
Γ.
Proof. See Appendix F.
7 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
7.1 Dataset Preparation and Evaluation Method for En-
ergy Demand Prediction
In the simulations, we utilize the actual dataset generated
from CSs’ transactions in Dundee city, the United Kingdom
between 2017 and 2018 [38] to show the efficiency of the
proposed learning and economic approaches. Specifically,
the dataset contains 65,601 transactions of charging EVs
with the following information: CS unique identifier (i.e.,
58 CSs), EV transaction identifier, EV transaction date, EV
transaction time, and energy usage (in kWh). We divide the
information into four learning features, i.e., the first four
information, and one label, i.e., the energy usage. Addition-
ally, we group CS identifier, EV transaction date, and EV
transaction time to be categorical features. In this case, we
transform the EV transaction date and EV transaction time
into 7-day and 24-hour categories, respectively. Moreover,
as seen in Fig. 4(a), each CS has the location information for
the clustering purposes.
To observe the prediction accuracy, we compute the
prediction error using RMSE. This is because we account
for the energy demand prediction which is classified as a
regression prediction model, i.e., when the output layer of
DNN produces the non-discrete prediction results. GivenM
number of transactions, the RMSE can be calculated by
RMSE =
√√√√ 1
M
M∑
m=1
(ξm − ξˆm)2, (50)
where ξm and ξˆm are the real and predicted energy demand
for transaction m.
7.2 Simulation Setup
We use TensorFlow in a shared computing platform with
Intel Xeon E5-2687W v2 3.4GHz 8 cores 32GB RAM to com-
pare the performance of the proposed learning techniques
with other centralized learning methods, i.e., a cloud server
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(a) CSs without clustering (b) CSs with clustering
Fig. 4: The distribution of CSs in Dundee city, the United Kingdom between 2017 and 2018 [38].
gathers actual datasets from all CSs and then performs the
learning algorithms to predict the energy demand. These
centralized methods include decision tree, random forest,
support vector regressor, k-neighbors regressor, stochastic
gradient descent regressor, multi-layer perceptron regressor,
and cloud-based deep learning [23]. We divide the dataset
into training dataset with ratios 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, and 0.5, and
testing dataset with the rest of the ratios. We also split
all transactions into I training subsets. Then, each CS-i
runs the training subsets as well as testing dataset for the
next energy demand prediction. For the CS clustering-based
DFEL method, we set K = 2 and split all the CSs into 2
clusters as illustrated in Fig. 4(b). For the learning process
using DNN, we add three layers including two hidden
layers with the same number of neurons, i.e., 64 neurons for
each layer, which are followed by one dropout layer with
a fraction rate 0.15. Moreover, we use the tanh activation
function and Adam optimizer which starts from step size
0.01.
Then, we compare the performance of proposed
economic model for energy transfer activity with the
information-symmetry [19], proportional-request, and non-
prediction methods [24]. For the information-symmetry
method, the CSs exactly know the type, i.e., the energy
capacity, of the SGP to find the optimal contract policy. In
this case, we use the information-symmetry method as the
upper bound solution. For the proportional-request method,
each CS obtains the proportional amount of energy accord-
ing to its energy demand without using contract policy.
Additionally, for the non-prediction method, the CSs request
energy transfer from the SGP immediately once they receive
energy demands from EVs (with fluctuated energy price
unit and without considering contract policy). In the con-
tract mechanism, we consider one agent, i.e., the SGP, and
58 principals corresponding to 58 CSs. We set the price unit
of energy transfer from the SGP at 200 monetary units (MU)
for the proposed, information-symmetry, and proportional-
request methods. We also set energy charging price of EVs
at 220MU per MWh [39] for all methods. For the proposed,
information-symmetry, and proportional-request methods,
the initial energy demands for all CSs are generated from
the energy demand prediction of CS-based DFEL when 0.8
training set ratio is used. To show various results of the
SGP, we consider 10 to 50 possible types with the same
distribution of the types, i.e., p(φ) = 1φmax . As such, each
type φ corresponds to the energy capacity φSmaxφmax MWh of
the SGP, where Smax is the maximum capacity of the SGP
regardless the number of possible types and set at 500MW.
Finally, we set ζ at 0.022.
7.3 Prediction Accuracy and Communication Over-
head Performance
We show the comparisons between centralized and pro-
posed machine learning methods for different ratios of
training set in Table 1. First, we analyze the RMSE, i.e.,
prediction accuracy, of the testing set when we use 0.8
training set ratio. Specifically, we can observe that the CS-
based DFEL with clustering can reduce the RMSE up to
24.63%, respectively, compared with those of the centralized
methods. The reason is that the CS clustering-based method
can combine similar important features and/or labels in the
same cluster, and thus improve the prediction accuracy [22].
In this way, we can minimize the biased prediction cost
of the whole dataset by clustering the CSs based on their
locations, which then produces the lower prediction error.
Furthermore, for the CS-based DFEL without clustering, the
performance of RMSE can achieve 23.51% lower than those
of the centralized learning methods. As such, the proposed
learning method without clustering can obtain less than
2% gap from the ones with clustering. The reason is that
the CS-based DFEL can thoroughly learn the subset of the
whole dataset individually at diverse workers and obtain
the average prediction with lower error as well as less vari-
ance regarding the number of workers [40]. We also observe
that the CS-based DFEL with and without clustering still
outperform all the centralized learning methods for other
training set ratios, i.e., 0.7, 0.6, and 0.5. To be more specific,
the CS-based DFEL with clustering has the lowest RMSE,
i.e., the best prediction accuracy, for those training set ratios.
Different from the proposed learning methods, the first
six centralized learning methods in the table cannot observe
the important features and their correlations. This is because
they are incapable of learning the complicated hidden fea-
tures using nonlinear transformation and multiple layers of
neural network. For the cloud-based deep learning method,
even though the RMSE performance is only 2% higher than
the CS-based DFEL due to the same utilization of the deep
learning algorithm, this method experiences the remarkable
communication overhead and information disclosure.
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TABLE 1: The comparison of testing RMSE for different
learning methods.
Energy learning method Ratio of training set0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5
K-neighbors regressor 7.18 7.71 7.57 7.67
Multi-layer perceptron 6.57 6.62 6.90 6.53regressor
Stochastic gradient 6.55 6.57 6.54 6.54descent regressor
Decision tree 6.47 6.49 6.47 6.47
Support vector regressor 6.46 6.50 6.50 6.53
Random forest 6.35 6.66 6.88 6.80
Cloud-based deep learning 5.86 5.86 5.86 5.87
CS-based DFEL 5.81 5.82 5.81 5.84
CS-based DFEL + 5.76 5.78 5.78 5.83CS Clustering
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Fig. 5: The performance of communication overhead and
learning speed for various energy learning methods.
To demonstrate the above drawback, we provide the
communication overhead and learning speed comparisons
for all learning methods in Fig. 5. As observed in Fig. 5(a),
the communication overheads of CS-based DFEL with and
without clustering are 96.3% lower than that of the central-
ized methods. The reason is that the CSs only require to
send the small learned models to each other through the
network without sharing any actual datasets. This benefit
corresponds to the information disclosure reduction for
participating EVs and CSs. Additionally, the use of CS-based
DFEL algorithm can further increase the learning speed
performance as shown in Fig. 5(b). In this case, the CS-based
DFEL without and with clustering can boost the learning
speed by 24% and 42%, respectively. For the CS-based DFEL
with clustering using 2 clusters, it outperforms the cloud-
based deep learning and CS-based DFEL methods because
it reduces the dataset dimension through learning smaller
number of samples in each cluster simultaneously.
7.4 Economic Model Performance
7.4.1 The validity of IR and IC constraints
In Fig. 6, we observe the IR and IC constraints of the SGP for
the proposed, i.e., non-collaborative contract, optimization
problem. From Fig. 6(a), the SGP always holds non-negative
utility for all possible types of the SGP, and thus satisfies the
original IR constraints in Eq. (16). As shown in the figure, the
utility of the SGP increases monotonically with regard to its
own type. As such, the SGP with a higher type will produce
a higher utility. This is because the participating CSs can
request more energy transfer from the SGP due to the fact
that a higher type SGP utilizes a larger energy capacity.
Correspondingly, the CSs require to offer higher payments
to the SGP which then help raising the SGP’s utility. Next,
from Fig. 6(b)-(c), we show that the SGP always achieves
the highest utility when it applies the appropriate contract
determined for its own type. Alternatively, the SGP may
degrade its utility performance when choosing unsuitable
contracts for its type. In this way, the original IC constraints
in Eq. (17) are satisfied. For example, the SGP with type 1,
type 5, and type 10 will achieve the highest utility when
it uses the appropriate contracts for type 1, type 5, and
type 8, respectively. Since we guarantee that the IR and IC
constraints of the SGP are achieved, we can then find the
feasible contracts for all CSs.
7.4.2 The social welfare of the network and utilities of CSs
We then demonstrate the social welfare of the EV network
in Fig. 7. In particular, we can enhance the social welfare
utilizing the SGP and 58 CSs when the type of the SGP gets
higher. Compared with the proportional-request and non-
prediction methods, the proposed method can improve the
social welfare up to 6% and 15%, respectively. Moreover,
the social welfare of our non-collaborative contract method
is 9% lower than that of information-symmetry contract
method, which works as the upper bound solution. The
reason is that, in practice, the CSs do not exactly know
the actual energy capacity of the SGP. Hence, the SGP may
use lower utilization of its energy capacity to serve the CSs
which then incurs lower social welfare of the network.
To further show the superiority of our proposed method,
in Fig. 8, we analyze the utilities of the first 6 CSs as the
representative CSs for 10 possible types of the SGP. We ob-
serve that the energy demands of CS-1, CS-2, CS-6 (referred
to as high-demand CSs) are higher than those of CS-3, CS-
4, and CS-5 (referred to as low-demand CSs). In particular,
the proposed method can leverage the utilities of the high-
demand and low-demand CSs up to 10% and 18%, re-
spectively, compared with those of the proportional-request
method. The reason is that, for the proposed method, all
CSs can utilize the optimal proportion from the SGP based
on the SGP’s IR and IC constraints to obtain the optimal con-
tracts. On the other hand, the proportional-request method
does not consider the contract policy as well as the SGP’s
common constraints. Thus, the proportions for all the CSs
and the CSs’ contracts cannot be optimized to produce
the best contracts. We can also observe that the utilities of
the high-demand and low-demand CSs are 26% and 35%
higher than those of the non-prediction method. This is
because the non-prediction method experiences fluctuated
daily energy prices (with high probability of more expensive
price) when the CSs directly request energy from the SGP
without predicting the energy demands [41].
7.4.3 The expected utilities of CSs vs number of the SGP’s
types
We then evaluate the proposed method performance as the
number of the SGP’s possible types increases between 5
and 50 types, with the SGP’s true type remains fixed at
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Fig. 6: The observation of the SGP’s IR and IC constraints for the proposed economic model.
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Fig. 7: Social welfare between the SGP and all CSs for
various methods.
type 5. This observation can be considered as the expected
utility performance when energy capacity of the SGP gets
smaller for the same true type of the SGP. Specifically, the
expected utilities of high-demand CSs fluctuate until the cer-
tain number of possible types, i.e., 20 possible types. Then,
those expected utilities degrade gradually when we further
increase the number of possible types. The reason is that the
high-demand CSs cannot find the type of the SGP accurately
due to the large range of the energy capacity when smaller
number of possible types is taken into account. The same
reason also applies for the low-demand CSs when they keep
increasing the expected utilities moderately until the case of
15 possible types. However, when the number of possible
types becomes bigger, we can observe that all the CSs will
achieve the almost-converged expected utility performance
at the maximum considered possible types of the SGP. In
this way, the accuracy to find the true type of the SGP
gets higher as the smaller range of the energy capacity is
obtained.
7.4.4 The total utilities of CSs vs the number of energy
transfer price units
To prove that the proposed economic model is always
more flexible than other non-contract-based methods, i.e.,
proportional-request and non-prediction methods, we eval-
uate the social welfare and total CSs’ utilities of the pro-
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Fig. 8: Various utilities of CSs for different methods.
posed method in Fig. 10 and 11, respectively. As such, the
SGP and CSs can negotiate together to change the energy
transfer price units. Particularly, when some CSs request
high energy transfer from the SGP, the SGP can slightly
reduce the price unit. Meanwhile, the SGP can increase the
price unit when only small amount of energy transfer is
requested by the other CSs. In this way, the SGP can attract
more low-demand CSs to compete in the contract process
with higher energy transfer proportions, thereby improving
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the social welfare of the network.
To this end, we show the social welfare improvement in
Fig. 10 for different number of negotiated energy transfer
price units between 190MU and 200MU. As observed in the
figure, the variation of the price units (between 10 and 30
price units) for energy transfer negotiation can further boost
the social welfare of the network up to 21% compared with
the scenario when only one fixed price unit is applied for
all energy transfer requests. This trend aligns with that of
the CSs’ total utilities as shown in Fig. 11. When the number
of energy transfer price units is only one, the total utilities
for all possible types suffer from the worst total utility
performance. However, when we further vary the number
of negotiated energy transfer price units, we can improve
the total utilities of the CSs for all possible types until reach-
ing the convergence. These results clearly demonstrate that
using the proposed economic model can always outperform
other conventional economic models (where the CSs only
can modify their utilities based on the given price unit from
the SGP without any negotiation) because of the flexibility
in the contract negotiation process.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed the novel energy-efficient
framework leveraging the effective contract theoretic-based
economic model to maximize the profits of CSs and improve
the social welfare in the EV network. In particular, we have
introduced the CS-based decentralized federated energy
learning (DFEL) framework which allows the CSs learning
the local dataset to predict energy demands accurately and
reduce the communication overhead significantly. More-
over, we have developed the CS clustering-based DFEL
approach for the CSs to further boost the energy demand
prediction accuracy and reduce the learning time due to
the smaller dataset dimension. Based on this prediction, we
have designed the MPOA contract-based economic model.
In particular, we have formulated the contract-based prob-
lem as the non-collaborative energy contract optimization
which satisfies the common constraints, i.e., the individ-
ual rationality and incentive compatibility, from the SGP.
This aims to maximize the expected utility of the CSs and
improve the social welfare in the energy transfer process.
Then, we have developed the iterative energy contract al-
gorithm to achieve the equilibrium contract solution for
all the CSs. Through simulation results, we have shown
that our proposed method outperforms other centralized
learning algorithms in terms of the prediction accuracy,
communication overhead, and learning speed. Moreover,
through the proposed method, we can significantly improve
the utilities of the CSs and the social welfare of the network
compared with other non-contract-based economic models.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
From the constraints (15)-(17), we can compute the total
number of constraints according to the considered number
of possible types φtot. Specifically, there are φtot number
of energy capacity constraints (15) and φtot number of the
IR constraints (16). In addition, there exist φtot(φtot − 1)
number of IC constraints (17). Hence, the total number of
constraints is
(
φtot +φtot +φtot(φtot− 1)
)
=
(
φtot +φ
2
tot
)
.
Since max
(
φtot, φ
2
tot
)
= φ2tot, then the computational com-
plexity of problem (P3) is O(φ2tot).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Using the IC constraint from the Definition 2, we first prove
that ρ(φ) > ρ(φ∗) if and only if φ > φ∗. Based on Eq. (13),
we now have
φG(pˆi,ρ(φ))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ)) ≥ φG(pˆi,ρ(φ∗))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ∗)),
(51)
and if the SGP has type φ∗, then we obtain
φ∗G(pˆi,ρ(φ∗))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ∗)) ≥
φ∗G(pˆi,ρ(φ))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ)), (52)
where φ 6= φ∗ and φ, φ∗ ∈ Φ. By combining Eq. (51) and
Eq. (52), we have
φG(pˆi,ρ(φ)) + φ∗G(pˆi,ρ(φ∗)) ≥
φG(pˆi,ρ(φ∗)) + φ∗G(pˆi,ρ(φ)),
φG(pˆi,ρ(φ))− φ∗G(pˆi,ρ(φ)) ≥
φG(pˆi,ρ(φ∗))− φ∗G(pˆi,ρ(φ∗)),
G(pˆi,ρ(φ))
(
φ− φ∗) ≥ G(pˆi,ρ(φ∗))(φ− φ∗).
(53)
Then, we divide both sides using (φ − φ∗), and thus
G(pˆi,ρ(φ)) > G(pˆi,ρ(φ∗)) considering that φ−φ∗ > 0 since
φ > φ∗. Based on Eq. (2), the gain function is strictly increas-
ing for all ρ(φ). Consequently, as G(pˆi,ρ(φ)) > G(pˆi,ρ(φ∗))
satisfies, we have ρ(φ) > ρ(φ∗).
Next, we prove that φ > φ∗ if and only if ρ(φ) > ρ(φ∗).
Using Eqs. (51)-(53), we get
φ
(
G(pˆi,ρ(φ))−G(pˆi,ρ(φ∗))) ≥
φ∗
(
G(pˆi,ρ(φ))−G(pˆi,ρ(φ∗)). (54)
By dividing both sides with
(
G(pˆi,ρ(φ))−G(pˆi,ρ(φ∗))), we
obtain φ > φ∗ accounting for
(
G(pˆi,ρ(φ))−G(pˆi,ρ(φ∗))) >
0 sinceG(pˆi,ρ(φ)) > G(pˆi,ρ(φ∗)). Based on Eq. (2), the gain
function is strictly increasing for all ρ(φ). As a result, we
prove that if ρ(φ) > ρ(φ∗), then φ > φ∗. The same process
can be used to prove that if φ = φ∗, then ρ(φ) = ρ(φ∗).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
We can first prove the conditions in Eq. (34) based on the
proof from Lemma 2 along with the following description.
From Eq. (2), we can compute the first-order form of the
gain function by
dG(pˆi,ρ(φ))
dφ
=
I∑
i=1
pˆii
dρi(φ)
dφ
1 +
I∑
i=1
pˆiiρi(φ)
≥ 0. (55)
Since 0 ≤ pˆii ≤ 1,∀i ∈ I , then
I∑
i=1
pˆii
1+
I∑
i=1
pˆiiρi(φ)
≥ 0. As a result,
dρi(φ)
dφ ≥ 0 satisfies the first-order condition in Eq. (55).
Next, for the conditions in Eq. (35), we can use the
contradiction to make the IC constraint cannot be satisfied.
In this case, there is at least one φ′ fails to comply with the
IC constraint such that
0 ≤ φG(pˆi,ρ(φ))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ)) <
φG(pˆi,ρ(φ′))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ′)), (56)
where φ < φ′. Alternatively, using the integration from φ to
φ′, we obtain∫ φ′
φ
(
φ
dG(pˆi,ρ(l))
dl
− dC(pˆi, ξ(l))
dl
)
dl > 0. (57)
From Eq. (35), we have
∫ φ′
φ
(
l dG(pˆi,ρ(l))dl − dC(pˆi,ξ(l))dl
)
dl = 0.
If φ < l < φ′, then
φ
dG(pˆi,ρ(l))
dl
≤ l dG(pˆi,ρ(l))
dl
. (58)
Hence, ∫ φ′
φ
(
φ
dG(pˆi,ρ(l))
dl
− dC(pˆi, ξ(l))
dl
)
dl < 0, (59)
and we can see the contradiction. Likewise, if φ > φ′, we
can also obtain the contradiction. In this case,
0 ≤ φ′G(pˆi,ρ(φ′))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ′)) <
φ′G(pˆi,ρ(φ))− C(pˆi, ξ(φ)), (60)
and ∫ φ
φ′
(
φ′
dG(pˆi,ρ(l))
dl
− dC(pˆi, ξ(l))
dl
)
dl > 0. (61)
Similarly, we also have
∫ φ
φ′
(
l dG(pˆi,ρ(l))dl − dC(pˆi,ξ(l))dl
)
dl = 0.
If φ′ < l < φ, then
φ′
dG(pˆi,ρ(l))
dl
≤ l dG(pˆi,ρ(l))
dl
. (62)
and ∫ φ
φ′
(
φ′
dG(pˆi,ρ(l))
dl
− dC(pˆi, ξ(l))
dl
)
dl < 0. (63)
Hence, we also obtain the contradiction.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
From the constraints (15), (37), (45), and (46), there exist
φtot number of energy capacity constraints (15), one con-
straint (37), φtot number of the constraints (38), and φtot
number of the constraints (39). Thus, the total number of
constraints is
(
φtot + 1 + φtot + φtot)
)
=
(
1 + 3φtot
)
.
16
As max
(
φtot, 1, φtot, φtot
)
= φtot, then the computational
complexity of problem (P5) is O(φtot).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Suppose C contains
(
ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
and(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
which are ordered by(
ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
>
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
. (64)
We first show that the choice Γˆi in Γi at CS-i, where
Γˆ
(θ+1)
i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
= max Γ
(θ+1)
i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
, is
increasing, i.e.,
Γˆ
(θ+2)
i
(
ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
≥ Γˆ(θ+1)i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
.
(65)
Let
(
ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
>
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
and
Γˆ
(θ+2)
i
(
ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
< Γˆ
(θ+1)
i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
to
show a contradiction. Then, we have
Ui
(
Γˆ
(θ+1)
i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
,ρ
(θ+2)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+2)
−i (φ)
)
+
Ui
(
Γˆ
(θ+2)
i
(
ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
,ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
≥
Ui
(
Γˆ
(θ+2)
i
(
ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
,ρ
(θ+2)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+2)
−i (φ)
)
+
Ui
(
Γˆ
(θ+1)
i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
,ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
.
(66)
From the definition of Γ(θ+1)i , Γˆ
(θ+1)
i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
∈
Γ
(θ+1)
i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
specifies that
Ui
(
Γˆ
(θ+1)
i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
,ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
≥
Ui
(
Γˆ
(θ+2)
i
(
ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
,ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
.
(67)
Then, based on Eq. (66) and Eq. (67), we can obtain
Ui
(
Γˆ
(θ+1)
i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
,ρ
(θ+2)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+2)
−i (φ)
)
≥
Ui
(
Γˆ
(θ+2)
i
(
ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
,ρ
(θ+2)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+2)
−i (φ)
)
,
(68)
and thus Γˆ(θ+1)i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
∈
Γ
(θ+2)
i
(
ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
. Alternatively, it indicates that
Γˆ
(θ+1)
i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
> Γˆ
(θ+2)
i
(
ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
.
From the definition of Γˆ(θ+1)i , it follows that
Γˆ
(θ+2)
i
(
ρ
(θ+1)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
−i (φ)
)
≥ Γˆ(θ+1)i
(
ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
which produces a contradiction. Hence, Γˆi is an increasing
function.
Based on the aforementioned increasing function, the
contract of CS-i at iteration θ + 1 can be updated to(
ρ
(θ+1)
i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
i (φ)
)
∈ Γ(θ+1)i if the condition in Eq. (48)
is satisfied. In this case, the use of κ can be seen as the
optimality tolerance to terminate the iterative algorithm.
Consequently, when all the CSs do not hold the condition
in Eq. (48) at iteration θ = ϑ, then we will obtain(
ρ
(ϑ+1)
i (φ), ξ
(ϑ+1)
i (φ)
)
=
(
ρ
(ϑ)
i (φ), ξ
(ϑ)
i (φ)
)
,
∀i ∈ I,∀φ ∈ Φ.
(69)
Consequently, for the rest of θ values start-
ing from ϑ, the algorithm obtains the same
Ui
(
ρ
(θ+1)
i (φ), ξ
(θ+1)
i (φ),ρ
(θ)
−i (φ), ξ
(θ)
−i (φ)
)
,∀i ∈ I . It implies
that the algorithm converges under the optimality tolerance
κ.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We adopt this proof from [21] and [37]. In particular, we first
show that an equilibrium exists through obtaining a fixed
point of Γ. Consider C∗ which contains
(
ρ(φ), ξ(φ)
)
∈ C.
This C∗ is a non-empty contract space since Γˆ
(
minC
)
≥
minC, Γˆ ∈ Γ, and thus
Γˆ
(
maxC∗
)
≥ maxC∗. (70)
As Γˆ is increasing as shown in the proof of Theorem 1, we
have
Γˆ
(
Γˆ
(
maxC∗
))
≥ Γˆ
(
maxC∗
)
, (71)
and thus Γˆ
(
maxC∗
)
∈ C∗. Then, we have Γˆ
(
maxC∗
)
≤
maxC∗i and obtain
Γˆ
(
maxC∗
)
= maxC∗. (72)
As a result, maxC∗ is a fixed point of Γ which contains(
ρ∗(φ), ξ∗(φ)
)
,∀φ ∈ Φ. This indicates that the equilibrium
exists, i.e.,
(
ρˆ(φ), ξˆ(φ)
)
=
(
ρ(φ)∗, ξ∗(φ)
)
,∀φ ∈ Φ.
Since the utilities of all CSs follow the increasing func-
tion until reaching a convergence under the κ, there is no
further solution improvement from all the CSs’ contracts.
Therefore, we conclude that the algorithm must converge to
the equilibrium contract solution
(
ρˆ(φ), ξˆ(φ)
)
,∀φ ∈ Φ, to
ensure that there is no such CS-i can improve its utility, i.e.,
Ui(ρˆi(φ), ξˆi(φ), ρˆ−i(φ), ξˆ−i(φ)), unilaterally.
